No Civilized System of Justice, Book Review: The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, The Supreme Court, and The Betrayal of Reconstruction by West, Sonja R
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
7-1-2008 
No Civilized System of Justice, Book Review: The Day Freedom 
Died: The Colfax Massacre, The Supreme Court, and The Betrayal 
of Reconstruction 
Sonja R. West 
University of Georgia School of Law, srwest@uga.edu 
 
Repository Citation 
Sonja R. West, No Civilized System of Justice, Book Review: The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, 
The Supreme Court, and The Betrayal of Reconstruction (2008), 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/816 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please 
contact tstriepe@uga.edu. 
 11 GREEN BAG 2D 521 
 
 
 
NO CIVILIZED 
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
Sonja R. West∗ 
Reviewing 
CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 
(Henry Holt 2008) 
HE FACTS LEADING UP TO the Supreme Court’s 2000 case 
of United States v. Morrison1 are well known to most Court 
watchers. Christy Brzonkala was an 18-year-old college 
freshman at Virginia Tech when she claims she was gang 
raped by two members of the school’s varsity football team. The 
attack left Brzonkala severely depressed and suicidal. 
She turned to her state for recourse. After being assured by 
school officials that they believed her account, Brzonkala filed an 
administrative complaint against her attackers under Virginia Tech’s 
sexual assault policy. But after forcing her to testify at two hearings 
– during which one of the players, Antonio Morrison, admitted to 
having sex with her after she twice told him “no” – the state school 
offered Brzonkala no remedy for her injuries. Both players were 
                                                                                                    
∗ Sonja West is an assistant professor of law at the University of Georgia School of Law. 
1 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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allowed to return to school without punishment (one kept his full-
ride scholarship).2 Brzonkala, meanwhile, dropped out of school. 
She later reported the crime to state authorities but a grand jury 
investigation failed to produce any indictments.3 The state system, 
under anyone’s definition, failed to protect Brzonkala’s civil rights. 
So Brzonkala next looked to her federal government for redress. 
She sued the two men under a section of the federal Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”)4 that provides a private 
cause of action against any “person … who commits a crime of vio-
lence motivated by gender.”5 The case wound its way to the Su-
preme Court of the United States. In the majority opinion written 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court never disputed Brzonkala’s 
allegations and recognized that, if true, she was clearly “the victim 
of a brutal assault.”6 Nonetheless, the Court held that Congress 
lacked the power to pass the VAWA’s private cause of action provi-
sion. Our system of federalism, Rehnquist stated, requires that any 
remedy to Brzonkala “must be provided by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and not by the United States.”7  
                                                                                                    
2 Brief for Petitioner at 4-6, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Morrison was found guilty of 
sexual assault. The school, however, without notice or explanation to Brzonkala, 
later lowered the charges from “sexual assault” to “using abusive language.” Later, 
again without notice to Brzonkala, the school set Morrison’s punishment aside 
entirely. Id. After being indicted on charges of rape and attempted sodomy of 
another student, the other player, James Crawford, pleaded guilty to the lesser 
charge of attempted aggravated sexual assault. Although he was sentenced to 
twelve months in prison, the sentencing court later suspended the entire sentence 
and placed him on “unsupervised probation.” Id. at 5, n.2. 
3 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. 
Morrison, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 140 (2000). Brzonkala did not initially pursue 
state criminal charges against the men because she believed the lack of physical 
evidence from the rape would doom her case. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. 
& State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997). 
4 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
5 42 § 13981(c). 
6 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
7 Id. 
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In a striking moment, however, Rehnquist concluded by observ-
ing that the brutality of the attack on Brzonkala demanded a gov-
ernmental response. “If the allegations here are true,” he declared, 
“no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for 
the conduct of respondent Morrison.”8 It was a remarkable state-
ment given that the state system in this case had done just that – left 
Brzonkala without a remedy. The federal government had at-
tempted to step in and correct the state’s egregious failure, but the 
Court had put a stop to it. The Court’s decision thus left the job of 
protecting certain constitutional rights solely with the states. Unfor-
tunately, this kind of hopeful reliance on the states to do the right 
thing has a proven history of being a poor path to a “civilized system 
of justice.”  
SEE ALSO UNITED STATES V. CRUIKSHANK 
nited States v. Morrison is most frequently discussed as a case 
about Congress’s constantly changing Commerce Clause pow-
ers. But the Court in Morrison gave the VAWA’s private action a 
one-two punch: first concluding it was unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause and then also finding it failed under the Four-
teenth Amendment. In the latter holding, the Court found that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action and provides no 
protection against private conduct “however discriminatory or 
wrongful.”9 In support of this finding, the Court in Morrison pro-
vided a long “see also” string citation. Last on the list of referenced 
cases stood a little known case from more than a century earlier – 
United States v. Cruikshank.10 
The Court quoted Cruikshank for the proposition that 
“[t]he fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriv-
ing any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one 
citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional 
                                                                                                    
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 621 (quotations omitted). 
10 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
U 
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guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the 
fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a mem-
ber of society.”11  
Nowhere in the Court’s discussion of Cruikshank did the Court ac-
knowledge that it was relying favorably on a case in which it had set 
free the perpetrators of one of the bloodiest race-based massacres in 
American history – the Colfax Massacre of 1873. Indeed a thorough 
reading of Cruikshank itself fails to reveal that the case arose out of a 
murderous rampage committed by a mob of white supremacists 
who gunned down more than sixty unarmed black men as they fled 
a burning courthouse while waving flags of surrender. If little is 
known about the events leading up to the Supreme Court’s Cruik-
shank decision, perhaps even less is known about the legal ramifica-
tions of that case. Ramifications that – as the Morrison case illustrates 
– have followed us into the twenty-first century. 
This is where Charles Lane comes in. 
In his new book, The Day Freedom Died,12 Lane, the Washington 
Post’s Supreme Court reporter from 2000 to 2006 (he is now an 
editorial writer for the paper), dives deep into the Colfax Massacre 
and the Cruikshank case that rose from its ashes. Through riveting 
narrative, he expertly pieces together what happened on Easter 
Sunday, 1873, in the small town of Colfax, Louisiana. Step by step 
he debunks the initial reports that a violent mob of armed black 
men had overthrown the local government and seized the town’s 
courthouse. According to those stories, relayed by white residents 
of Colfax, the white men were acting in self-defense when they 
formed a posse and, after attempts at a truce failed, smoked the 
black men out of the courthouse. It was this version of events that 
persisted well into the next century.13 Lane sets the record straight 
                                                                                                    
11 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554). 
12 Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died (Henry Holt 2008). 
13 In 1950, for example, the state of Louisiana erected a seven-foot-tall historic 
marker at the site of the courthouse that claimed that the “Colfax Riot” was 
noteworthy because it allegedly “marked the end of carpetbag misrule in the 
South.” Id. at 260.  
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by carefully weaving together the facts that led up to the bloody 
debacle. The truth, Lane’s readers learn, is a story of hatred, vio-
lence and racial discrimination. It also is a story of our dual system 
of government – both its potential and its failures.  
The story that Lane builds is of a particular town that, like the 
entire nation, had been torn apart by the Civil War. More than a 
decade had gone by since the Emancipation Proclamation, and the 
United States government was still struggling to honor its many 
promises of Reconstruction. Three new constitutional amendments 
provided a hopeful start: the Thirteenth abolished slavery, the Four-
teenth made former slaves United States citizens and guaranteed 
them basic equality, and the Fifteenth secured the right to vote for 
black men. Relying on new powers granted by these Amendments, 
Congress began passing a series of civil rights laws, including the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, which made racial terrorism a federal 
offense. 
To the black residents of Colfax, Louisiana, however, the prom-
ise of equality embodied in these laws must have seemed elusive and 
shadowy. As Lane tells it, the pro-Reconstruction Republicans of 
Colfax had every rightful claim to the local judgeship and sheriff’s 
office, but virulent white supremacists insisted that their men had 
been elected to these positions and used fraudulent commissions to 
get sworn into office. Both groups knew that control of the town 
hinged on control of the local courthouse. A group of mostly black 
Republicans successfully entered the courthouse building in the 
middle of the night, claiming the contested offices and the political 
power that went with it as their own. What followed was a three-
week standoff during which the white supremacists assembled a 
posse of former Confederate soldiers. After the Republican occupi-
ers refused to yield, the posse fired on the black men holed up in 
the courthouse, even putting to use a small cannon. The occupiers 
held on until the posse turned to a new deadly tactic. They set fire 
to the courthouse and shot the black men as they ran for their lives 
– many waving white flags of surrender. Those who weren’t killed 
on the spot were taken prisoner, only to be executed a short time 
later. In the end, Lane estimates that between sixty-two and eighty-
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one black men were murdered. The three white men who died that 
day were likely the victims of friendly fire. 
Lane next turns his focus to the quest for justice for the victims. 
State efforts to prosecute failed quickly. A Louisiana district attor-
ney managed to obtain indictments but was then met by an armed 
white mob angry over the attempt to prosecute. Left without any 
protection to help him enforce state law, the district attorney fled 
and the state indictments withered.  
The only hope now lay with the federal government and a 
young, idealistic prosecutor named James Beckwith who had the 
radical idea that murderers of black victims should receive the same 
punishment as murderers of whites. After learning of the events in 
Colfax, Beckwith initiated what would become a long and historic 
attempt to bring the perpetrators of the Colfax Massacre to justice. 
He began by indicting 97 men on 32 counts of violating the En-
forcement Act. With frustratingly little support from Washington, 
he was able to bring only nine men to trial. The initial proceeding 
produced a mistrial, with jurors split down racial lines. In the fol-
low-up trial, Beckwith presented a string of testimony from mostly 
black witnesses who testified to the events of that bloody Sunday 
and directly identified the defendants as murderers. In the end, the 
jury convicted three of the men on the lesser charge of conspiracy – 
a violation of section 6 of the Enforcement Act. To Beckwith and 
the black community of Colfax, this verdict was a watered-down 
but real vindication. To most of white Louisiana it was a shocking 
indignation.  
It was now time for the Supreme Court to get involved. 
“SORRY FOR THE ‘DRED’” 
ustice Joseph Philo Bradley, who was riding the federal circuits of 
the Deep South, happened to be in New Orleans when the second 
Cruikshank trial began. Following the practice at the time, he sat in 
on some early motions including a defense challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the Enforcement Act, the statutory basis for the con-
victions. Justice Bradley postponed ruling on the motion, ordered 
the trial to continue and then left town. But after hearing news of 
J 
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the verdicts against the three white men he made the long journey 
back to the Crescent City to rule on the defense’s motion. Lawyers 
for the white defendants had argued that Congress did not have the 
power to pass the Enforcement Act under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which declares only that “no state” can infringe rights of life, 
liberty and property. According to the defense, the Amendment did 
not speak at all about acts committed by individuals so that the duty 
to punish such “personal aggression” remained solely with the state 
and not the federal government. Justice Bradley agreed. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley explained, does not give 
Congress the power to pass laws for the punishment “of murder, 
false imprisonment, robbery or any other crime committed by indi-
vidual malefactors.”14 Rather, he reasoned, it only allows Congress 
to protect individuals from “arbitrary and unjust” action by the 
state.15 Congress, therefore, could pass legislation to protect the 
black men of Colfax from official violation of their civil liberties, 
but it was powerless to protect them from a violent racist mob. 
Based on this reasoning, the section of the Enforcement Act under 
which the Cruikshank defendants had been convicted was unconstitu-
tional.16 The guilty verdicts, Justice Bradley ruled, had to be over-
turned.  
The case went to the Supreme Court for a ruling on the consti-
tutional question. While the case lingered on the Court’s docket, 
white supremacist violence erupted across the South as the Bradley 
opinion was seen as giving a green light for race-based attacks. After 
nearly a year of deliberation and drafting, a unanimous Court 
agreed with Justice Bradley’s lower court decision.17 Chief Justice 
Waite delivered the opinion of the Court, which parroted much of 
Justice Bradley’s reasoning. The Cruikshank defendants were ac-
                                                                                                    
14 Id. at 206. 
15 Id. 
16 Justice Bradley further held that even if the Act were constitutional, the indict-
ment charging the men was flawed because it did not allege that the acts were 
committed for racially discriminatory reasons. Id. at 209-210. 
17 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542. 
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cused, Waite contended, of “nothing else than alleging a conspiracy 
to falsely imprison or murder.”18 The Constitution did not give the 
federal government the power to punish crimes like these, because 
the Fourteenth Amendment “adds nothing to the rights of one citi-
zen as against another.”19 The Court handed down its ruling without 
acknowledging that it was setting free three men who had been 
convicted of participating in a racially inspired mass murder. 
More than a century later, Chief Justice Rehnquist would re-
mark that “no civilized system of government” would deny Christy 
Brzonkala a remedy for her injuries even though Virginia had done 
just that. In Cruikshank, Chief Justice Waite made a similar – if also 
unintentional – critique of Louisiana when he stated that “[e]very 
republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in 
the enjoyment of [their civil liberties], if within its power.”20 But 
like Rehnquist in Morrison, Waite also seemed indifferent about 
whether the state had actually fulfilled that duty. Waite’s concern, 
rather, was whether the federal government had any power to act 
against private wrongdoers when the states failed. He concluded 
that it did not. “The only obligation resting upon the United States 
is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment 
guarantees, but no more.”21  
Lane’s book illustrates superbly why the Court’s decision was so 
devastating to Reconstruction’s goals of equality. Across the South, 
white supremacists were engaging in a widespread campaign of per-
sonal terror aimed at denying black citizens their rights of equal 
treatment and due process. State governments, meanwhile, lacked 
either the will or the power to offer protection. The Court’s deci-
sion thus allowed private mobs to assail their African-American fel-
low citizens at will. These racist groups were sending their black 
neighbors a clear and chilling message that the penalty for political 
                                                                                                    
18 Id. at 553. 
19 Id. at 554.  
20 Id. at 555. 
21 Id. 
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participation – whether it was by seeking to vote, standing for elec-
tion or assuming office once elected – was death. 
Lane tells an anecdote where a friend of Chief Justice Waite’s 
half-jokingly referred to the Cruikshank decision as comparable to 
the Court’s infamous Dred Scott opinion. “Sorry for the ‘Dred,’” 
Lane reports that Waite replied, “but to my mind there was no es-
cape.”22 
A SHIELD AGAINST ANARCHY 
AS WELL AS TYRANNY 
he decision from which Chief Justice Waite could find no es-
cape thus joined the ranks of the Court’s Reconstruction Era 
cases, many of which are far better known than Cruikshank. The 
Slaughter-House Cases, for example, gutted the “privileges or immu-
nities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving Congress and 
future Supreme Courts to turn to other clauses, such as the Equal 
Protection Clause, to battle discriminatory laws.23 In United States v. 
Harris the Court followed Cruikshank by holding that the Ku Klux 
Klan Act was unconstitutional because Congress could not punish 
the private acts of a lynch mob.24 And in the Civil Rights Cases Justice 
Bradley declared that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitu-
tional insofar as it prohibited racial discrimination by private per-
sons in the operation of public accommodations.25 The Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, he reasoned, did not give Congress any power 
to legislate “what may be called the social rights of and races in the 
community.”26 He famously added that the time had come for for-
mer slaves to “take[] the rank of a mere citizen, and cease[] to be the 
special favorite of the laws.”27 
                                                                                                    
22 Lane, supra note 12, at 247. 
23 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
24 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
25 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
26 Id. at 30. 
27 Id. at 25. This holding was in stark contrast to a dissenting opinion Justice Bradley 
wrote a decade earlier in which he observed that “[m]erely striking off the fetters 
T 
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When the Morrison case arrived at the Supreme Court in the be-
ginning of the year 2000, the case of a brutal rape of a college stu-
dent might not have seemed to have much in common with the 
nineteenth century actions of a murderous racist mob. But the fights 
to obtain justice for Christy Brzonkala and the victims of the Colfax 
Massacre have many things in common. In both cases the states 
proved to be either unable or unwilling to provide a remedy even if 
they were “duty bound” to do so and if any “civilized system of jus-
tice” would demand it. And in both cases Congress had concluded 
that it was necessary for the federal government to fill the void and 
secure the constitutional rights that the states had allowed to be 
trampled. The Supreme Court, moreover, was the final arbiter in 
both cases, and in each of them declared that Congress was helpless 
to act even in the face of violent and still unremedied acts of class-
based discrimination. 
In Cruikshank, the Justices were faced with two competing and 
prominent views of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. They could have sided with the opinion of the Cruik-
shank trial judge – the Honorable William Burham Woods then of 
the Fifth Circuit but who later would himself be elevated to the Su-
preme Court by President Hayes. In a prior case, Judge Woods had 
concluded that the federal government could protect individuals not 
only from discriminatory state laws but also from “state inaction, or 
incompetency.”28 In other words, if a state government failed to 
adequately protect the civil rights of its citizens, the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress the power to step in and fill the void. 
As Lane explains, “[a]ccording to Woods, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was a shield against anarchy as well as tyranny.”29 But the 
Cruikshank Court instead adopted the far more restrictive view of 
Justice Bradley. 
                                                                                                    
of the slave, without removing the incidents and consequences of slavery, would 
hardly have been a boon to the colored race.” Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 
601 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
28 United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). 
29 Lane, supra note 12, at 115. 
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In United States v. Morrison, the Solicitor General advanced an ar-
gument that closely tracked the reasoning of Judge Woods. Accord-
ing to the Solicitor General, Congress had the power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to pass the VAWA in order to address 
gender-motivated crime because the states were not doing so effec-
tively. Congress had found that the states were “routinely treat[ing] 
violent crimes motivated by gender less seriously than other violent 
crimes,”30 and that “the States’ own effort to eliminate such bias had 
not succeeded and required federal assistance.”31 This finding, even 
Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted, was “supported by a voluminous 
congressional record.”32 The four dissenters in Morrison agreed with 
the Solicitor General that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed 
Congress to provide a private remedy to make up for the states’ 
failure. “But why can Congress not provide a remedy against private 
actors?” Justice Breyer asked in dissent.33 The statutory remedy “in-
trudes very little upon either States or private parties. It may lead 
state actors to improve their own remedial systems, primarily 
through example.”34 
In large numbers, the states themselves agreed with the result 
advocated by the dissenters. The attorneys general for thirty-six 
states plus the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed an amicus brief 
in Morrison urging the Court to uphold the VAWA. They told the 
Court that the VAWA’s civil remedy provision “complements state 
and local efforts to combat violence against women without in any 
way compromising those efforts, it does not undermine federal-
ism.”35 Only one state, Alabama, argued in favor of Morrison.  
But Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by four other jus-
tices, rejected the argument that Congress may act when the states 
“through discriminatory design or the discriminatory conduct of 
                                                                                                    
30 Brief for the United States at 37, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
31 Id. at 42. 
32 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620. 
33 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. (quotations omitted). 
35 Brief of the States of Arizona, et al. at 21, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
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their officials”36 fail to do so. According to Rehnquist, the “language 
and purpose” of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress no 
power to raise a “‘shield against merely private conduct, however 
discriminatory or wrongful.’”37 Thus thanks to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison, Justice Souter argued, “the States will be 
forced to enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not.”38 
In support for the majority’s ruling, Rehnquist quoted the legis-
lative record from the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1875. In pass-
ing these laws, he argued, it was clear that Congress hoped to pro-
vide protection to former slaves in situations where the states were 
refusing to enforce nearly identical laws on their books. This was 
analogous to Congress’s goals with the VAWA. Thus, he argued, if 
the Supreme Court found the Civil Rights Acts unconstitutional it 
followed that the VAWA must be unconstitutional as well. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the legislative record of the 
Civil Rights Acts passed during Reconstruction is perplexing con-
sidering another argument he made in favor of upholding Cruik-
shank, Harris and the Civil Rights Cases. He contended that  
[t]he force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these deci-
sions stems not only from the length of time they have been 
on the books, but also from the insight attributable to the 
Members of the Court at that time. Every Member had 
been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Gar-
field, or Arthur – and each of their judicial appointees ob-
viously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the 
events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.39  
In other words, the Court should defer to the Justices who decided 
the Reconstruction Era cases because they had more insight into the 
true purpose behind the Fourteenth Amendment. They were there, 
                                                                                                    
36 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 664 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 620, 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 3 and n.12 (1948)). 
38 Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 622. 
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after all, and thus better able to discern the intentions of the fram-
ers of these Amendments. 
It is perhaps this argument that Lane’s book is most helpful in 
debunking in two ways. The first is through Lane’s depiction of the 
Supreme Court Justices simply as human beings who were as af-
fected by the tumultuous events surrounding them as anyone else. 
These were men who were products of their time, which Lane 
paints as a shockingly and overtly racist era. When Cruikshank came 
before the Court, much of the country was suffering what today’s 
media likely would label “Reconstruction fatigue.” The nation in 
1873 was turning its attention toward economic issues and away 
from the plight of the former slaves. According to Lane, the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court were as disillusioned with Reconstruc-
tion as many other white citizens. Two of the Justices were Democ-
rats who likely had little sympathy for the former slaves or for Re-
publican policies. But even among the pro-Lincoln Republicans on 
the bench, most were concerned more with the preservation of the 
union than with the equality of the races. And while several of the 
Justices, including Justice Bradley, had written eloquently about the 
importance of equality among the races, Lane shows how their ac-
tions, both on the bench and off, rarely lived up to their ringing 
words. It is difficult to read Lane’s portrayal and conclude that the 
Court should defer blindly to the views of these Justices as to what 
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies simply because they were 
there.  
Lane’s book further exposes the flaws in Rehnquist’s deference 
to the Cruikshank Justices’ front-row view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by offering insight into what the actual drafters of the 
Amendment likely believed. Rehnquist relied on the views of these 
Justices because they were alive during the drafting and ratification 
of the Reconstruction Amendments, but the more relevant testi-
mony surely can be found in the words of those who actually had a 
hand in creating them. In Cruikshank, Attorney General George 
Williams argued before the Court in favor of Congress’s power to 
pass the Enforcement Act. Unlike any of the Justices, Williams had 
been a sitting senator during the enactment of the post-Civil War 
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Amendments and participated actively in their passage. He pointed 
out to the Court that virtually the same legislators who had drafted 
and passed the Amendments had also drafted and passed the civil 
rights legislation that followed, including the Enforcement Act. The 
Court must remember, he told the Justices,  
that these amendments and the legislation under them were 
practically made by the same hands. Is it to be supposed 
that those who drew the amendments did not know their 
scope? According to the arguments on the other side it 
must be assumed of the Senators and Representatives either 
that they violated their oath or that they did not know the 
meaning of the language which they used themselves.40  
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Morrison offers support 
for the position staked out by George Williams. In particular, 
Rehnquist cites the statement of Representative Garfield in the 
House who argued that federal legislation to protect the former 
slaves was necessary because state laws suffered from “a systematic 
maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their 
provisions.”41 In sum, historical evidence suggests that those who 
truly had “intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events sur-
rounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” – members 
of the Congress that brought it into being – believed that the 
Amendment empowered Congress to right constitutional wrongs 
when the states, through overt action or blatant inaction, failed to 
do so. 
?? 
ane ends his book with a wistful epilogue of what might have 
been had the Supreme Court gone the other way in Cruikshank. 
With that decision, Lane contends, the United States lost its best 
chance at creating “the world’s first true interracial democracy.”42 
He points to the “unpunished slaughter” in Colfax and the “narrow-
                                                                                                    
40 Lane, supra note 12, at 241. 
41 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625. 
42 Lane, supra note 12, at 251. 
L 
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ing of federal law enforcement” in the Cruikshank decision as key 
constitutional milestones.43 They were part of a regression of civil 
liberties that would continue to grow exponentially. It would take 
the Supreme Court a century to begin to undo the damage. 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court had 
another opportunity to allow the Fourteenth Amendment to fulfill 
essential promises that were first made and broken during Recon-
struction. Christy Brzonkala and the Colfax Massacre victims were 
all brutally targeted – one because of her gender and the others be-
cause of their race. The United States Constitution guarantees indi-
viduals protection from such violence, or at least affords Congress 
the power to provide a remedy for their injuries. Yet in both of 
these cases, their states failed to act for discriminatory reasons. The 
Constitution of 2000, like the Constitution of 1873, does not sim-
ply abandon its citizens when their civil rights are harmed in this 
manner. Rather, one of the beauties of our system of federalism is 
that it provides not one but two opportunities for a truly civilized 
system of justice. 
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